Financing source and firm growth in a hybrid financial system:evidence from China United Nations World Institutes for Development Research by Du, Jun & Girma, Sourafel
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032942
Financing Source and Firm Growth in a Hybrid Financial 
System: Evidence from China 
 
Jun Du 
Aston Business School, 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
United Kingdom 
 
Email: j.du@aston.ac.uk
 
and  
 
Sourafel Girma 
Nottingham University Business School 
Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road 
Nottingham, NG8 1BB 
United Kingdom 
 
Email: Sourafel.Girma @nottingham.ac.uk
 
 
Abstract 
Using a comprehensive firm-level dataset spanning the period 1998-2005, this paper 
depicts a detailed picture of China’s financial sectors and industrial firms’ financing 
pattern, and provides a thorough investigation of the relationship between financing 
source and firm growth. We take into account firm surviving selectivity and reverse 
causality of firm financing source into account, and find that financing source matters 
for firm growth in China, although this does not tell the whole story. The relative 
importance of the different financing sources depends on firm ownership and growth 
channel. We find strong complementarities between formal financing channels and 
informal ones, and between domestic finance and foreign investment in promoting 
firm’s growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The co-existence of a formal financial sector and an informal financial sector in many 
developing countries, commonly known as financial dualism, is neither a new 
phenomenon in practice, nor new knowledge in the literature. According to the 
OECD’s estimates, the extent of informal financial during 1970s and 1980s is 
enormous: the volume of mobilized savings equal to 10% of the total GDP in 
Ethiopia, 83% of the agricultural loans and 93% urban business capital in Indonesia, 
and 30% of the total urban credit issued in India (Germidies, Kessler and Meghir, 
1991). China, as in many other cross-country studies, has been missed out from the 
comparison. In fact, little is known about whether and how informal financial sector 
works, and how much economic activity it supports in China (Cull, Xu and Zhu, 
2007). In the recently heated debates on China’s finance and growth puzzle, this has 
become a particularly highlighted issue. 
While the finance and growth literature has consistently established the belief 
that a healthy financial system is necessary for a country to maintain economic 
growth (see Levine, 2005 for a comprehensive survey), China emerges as a counter 
example. The Chinese economy has maintained an unprecedented economic growth 
for the last thirty years, despite of its financial systems generally being regarded 
underdeveloped even by developing nations’ standards (standard Boyreay-Debray, 
2005; Allen et al 2005). How did this happen? What role does China’s financial 
system play in the economy? Is China really a counter example?  
The “China’s finance-growth puzzle” could have two explanations. One could 
be that the theoretical prediction about finance and growth relationship will apply for 
China; it just has not applied yet; the other could be that the theory does not apply for 
China at all. Should the actual explanation lie in the second scenario, in which a 
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deficient financial system can become a hurdle of the economic growth, it would send 
an obviously worrying signal to China about its economic sustainability. Some 
stylized facts provide support to this scenario. China has maintained high growth in 
spite of the problems in its financial system in part because of the continuous 
investment and infrastructure spending. China’s global trade surplus has increased 
steadily over more than a decade, which by 2006 made China the world’s largest 
current account surplus country (Lardy, 2006). Meanwhile, with over 40% saving rate 
that is among the highest in the world, pouring into the financial sectors which are 
dominated by state-owned commercial banks, funds are not the scarcest resource for 
the economy. It is likely that given the excessive available funds, its usage may not be 
as efficient as it would be in an investment-starved condition. It is unlikely, however, 
that this situation can be sustained indefinitely, considering that the projected savings 
shows a declining trend as a response to the government policy (Kuijs, 2005), and that 
the global trade environment is constantly changing. In such a case, it would be a 
matter of time before the finance-growth theory works effectively on China – its 
underdeveloped financial arrangements would finally be impediments to the 
economic growth. Then improving financial resource allocation efficiency at the 
earliest stage would be most critical for a sustainable economy.  
If however, the true explanation lies in the first scenario, according to which 
the current finance-growth theory does not apply to China, then discovering why the 
theory does not apply will add to the existing literature with an undismissible case 
study in the world economy. Recent empirical studies raise some albeit conflicting 
arguments on the topic. On the one hand, Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), hereafter 
AQQ, find that the key driver of China’s economic growth has been the private sector, 
while informal finance and governance mechanisms have been more important and 
more efficient than the formal financial system in supporting its growth (also see Liu 
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and Li, 2001). On the other hand, there is evidence that the performance of Chinese 
private enterprises is associated with the access to formal bank loans (Cull and Xu, 
2005), and firms using formal financing sources grow faster than those financed by 
alternative channels (Cheng and Degryse 2007; Maksimovic et al 2008). With the 
apparent disputes, it is difficult to draw a conclusion on the role of the Chinese 
financial system that appears to be a mixture of formal and informal financial 
institutions and agents. We analyze the possible reasons of the conflicting evidence 
found in previous studies in our paper. Further investigations are therefore warranted 
to uncover the mechanism of the finance and economic growth relationship, 
importantly based on adequate micro-level evidence (also see Cheng and Degryse, 
2007). 
Our paper aspires to fill in this gap by providing a systematic analysis of the 
relationship between financing sources and firm growth in China using the most 
comprehensive and up-to-date firm-level dataset available. Based on a detailed profile 
of the financing channels available firms in China both in formal financial sector and 
in informal ones, we consider four major types of financing channels for Chinese 
industrial enterprises: the commonly considered channels in the previous studies, 
namely (1) formal financing source through domestic bank loans, and (2) self-raised 
finance through informal financing sources, as well as from (3) state budget and (4) 
foreign investors that existing studies tend to ignore from their analyses.  In particular, 
we seek to answer the following two questions:  (i) Does the source of finance matter 
for firm growth at all?  (ii) If so, among firms’ financing sources, which is the most 
important for firm growth in China and under what circumstances?  
By answering these questions, we expect to improve our understanding of the 
role of each financing channel in supporting industrial enterprises’ growth 
performance in China. The findings will also shed some light on the debate around the 
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performance of China’s financial system. If there is robust evidence that informal 
financing channels consistently outperform formal financing channel, it would 
indicate financial resource misallocation, considering that formal financial 
intermediaries that control at least 70% of the financial capital only serve less than 
30% of manufacturing firms i . If, on the other hand, there is evidence that these 
financing channels are complementary in serving economic growth, then it may 
encourage us to rethink about China’s financial system as an unconventional mix of 
formal and informal financial institutions and agents. Either way, the findings will 
provide useful insights to China’s finance-growth puzzle, and useful lessons to other 
developing and transition economies in which the principal financial institutions are 
state-owned and the private sector starts to dominate the economic landscape. Last, 
but certainly not the least, the findings will also present some implications on China’s 
current reform towards maximizing the economic growth potential.  
Accounting for sample selectivity and potential endogeneity of finance 
variables, we find robust evidence that the source of finance indeed matters to firm 
growth. However the relationship between financing sources and firm growth differs 
across the type of firm ownership and growth channel, namely TFP growth and 
employment growth. We also find strong complementarities between formal financing 
channels and informal ones, and between domestic finance and foreign investment in 
promoting firm’s growth.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical arguments 
as to why financing sources should matter to growth and review the recent debates on 
China’s finance and growth puzzle.  Section 3 describes China’s current financial 
sectors and the financing patterns of Chinese firms.  Section 4 presents the empirical 
model and discuss some econometric issues that arise. Sector 4 describes the data 
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while Section 5 discusses the empirical findings of the paper. Finally, Section 6 
concludes. 
2. The Literature 
2.1 Why should financing source matter? 
The theoretical literature provides us limited guidance as to why should financing 
sources make any difference. The mainstream theories and evidence in the finance 
and growth literature are developed with the default focus on formal financial system 
development, which in fact makes sense in most developed economies where the 
formal financial system dominates. For many developing economies in which 
informal financial institutions may be just as important or even more so, the existing 
theories on informal financial system and its role in the economy are largely limited to 
Stiglitz (1990) and Arott and Stigltz (1990). Set in the context of credit market and 
insurance market, they build up models to evaluate the effects of peer monitoring 
systems of informal (or “non-market” as used by the authors) lenders and insurers. 
The authors demonstrate that given the right incentives, informal lenders and insurers 
may stand in a superior position than their formal counterparts to address the 
insufficient informational problems and generate improved welfare for the borrowers 
and the insured.  
Opposite arguments contend that informal financial arrangements only play a 
complementary role to formal financial systems by serving the low end of the market, 
but can never be a substitute for the formal system because of their inadequate 
monitoring capability and enforcement mechanisms (Maksimovic et al 2008). 
Unfortunately, the comparative advantages of informal financial system in low-
income economies have not been empirically tested, and investigations still remain 
being conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
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2.2 China’s finance-growth puzzle 
The studies that examine the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in China are mostly conducted at national or provincial level, and 
typically they discover evidence of resource misallocation. For example, Liang and 
Tend (2006) use annual aggregate data in 1952-2001 period and find a unidirectional 
causality from economic growth to financial development. They argue that level of 
bank credit has not caused economic growth, which suggest the channel of efficient 
capital allocation is not working well.  
Being an original work that raises China as a counterexample to the findings 
in the law, finance and growth literature, AQQ (2005) contend that the key driver of 
the country’s growth has been the private sector, and this sector tends to rely on 
informal finance and governance mechanisms rather than formal financing channels. 
There is also evidence that shows non-state financing sources are generally more 
efficient in promoting output growth at provincial level between 1985 and 1998 (Liu 
and Li, 2001).  
By contrast, using the recent Investment Climate Survey (ICS) conducted by 
the World Bank, Cull and Xu (2005) find that the performance of Chinese private 
enterprises is actually associated with the access to bank loans, along with enterprise 
managers’ risk perception about property rights and local legal conditions. 
Maksimovic et al (2008), using the same data, also find that firms using formal 
financing sources grow faster than those financed by alternative channels. They argue 
that the role of informal financingii and governance mechanisms in supporting the 
growth of private sector firms is likely to be limited. Similarly, Cheng and Degryse 
(2007) provide evidence that at provincial level banks contribute more significantly to 
local economic growth than non-bank financial institutions, especially in the regions 
with foreign entry. Hence they attribute the improved efficiency of the banking 
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industry to the ongoing financial reform, and particularly to the commercialization of 
state-owned commercial banks, the deregulations for foreign entry and liberalization 
of interest rates. 
This apparent dispute regarding the role of formal and informal financing 
channels in China’s economic growth may partially be explained by the different 
datasets and methodologies used. For example, AQQ (2005) adopt a case study 
approach and collect data from a survey of 17 entrepreneurs and executives in 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces. The two provinces in the survey are known for being 
advanced in terms of the privatization process among the 31 provinces of China. 
Furthermore, some cities, such as Wenzhou, have a long history of small family 
business. It is therefore unsurprising to find that informal financing channels based on 
human connections and reputations are very important in their sample of firms. In 
contrast, the ICS survey used by Cull and Xu (2005) and Maksimovic et al (2008) 
displays quite different composition. For example, only 39 firms (3% of the whole 
sample) are located in Wenzhou.  
Empirical studies based on large-scale firm level date start emerging recently, 
as data become more and more available. Among others, Cull, Xu and Zhu (2007) 
examine the role of trade credit as an informal financing channel in China, and 
conclude that it does not play an economically significant role. Even more, it may 
further decline as the formal financing allocation becomes more efficient. Other 
studies, mostly conducted at aggregate level or using limited survey data, can hardly 
give satisfactory explanations to the conflicting arguments. As such, the jury is still 
out on the relationship between finance and growth in China.  
3. Financing Patterns in China  
3.1 Financial sectors in China 
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As in many other developing countries, formal financial sectors and informal financial 
sectors comprise China’s financial system. By schematizing both sectors, Table 1 
shows that the formal finance sector covers a wide variety of institutions while the 
mechanisms and agents of the informal sector are equally diverse.  
 The formal financial sector can be represented on three levels – the Ministry 
of Finance, Banks and other financial intermediaries, and capital markets, as the first 
figure in Table 2. The Ministry of Finance takes a predominant role in the economy 
by administering macroeconomic policies and the national annual budget, and by 
handling the fiscal policy and government expenditure. At firm level, state budget 
appropriations are the direct investment from the state budget by central and local 
governments.  
The second level is composed of various banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, regulated by the People’s Bank of China. They are the major players in 
the formal sector, which is in fact dominated by four large state-owned commercial 
banks claiming around 70% market share in terms of both national savings and loans 
during 1995-2002 (Du, 2006). These banks used to carry some policy-related 
functions in the past and this partially explains the soft-budget constraint phenomenon 
(Lin et al, 1998), the large amount of non-performing loans (e.g. Ma and Gung, 2002) 
and their lack of operational efficiency (Du, 2006; Berger et al, 2008)iii. Furthermore, 
it has been argued that the Chinese banking sector is regionally segmented; financial 
resources are not mobile and they are allocated inefficiently (Lardy, 1998; Cull and 
Xu, 2003; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005).  
The third level lies China’s emerging capital market. Compared to most 
countries in the world, even developing economies, the Chinese capital market is 
much smaller in terms of the size of stock marketiv. The two Chinese stock exchange 
markets were established in the early 1990s, and by 2004 only 1,337 companies were 
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listed in the market, which represent only about 1% of the manufacturing industry in 
terms of industrial value added. The stock market is thus by no means an important 
financing channel for the majority of domestic firms. Apart from being small, China’s 
capital markets lack efficiency, which may be due to being policy-driven (Heilmann, 
2002) or due to ineffective regulations (AQQ, 2005).  
Informal financial sectors are comprised of savers, lenders and borrowers that 
can be individuals, firms or associations that act as financial intermediaries but not 
regulated by authorities. Three types of informal financial operators are classified: 
individual moneylenders, associations and partnership firms (see figures in Table 1). 
As has been previously documented in other developing countries, one of the striking 
characteristics of the informal financial sector is the importance of personal 
relationship (Germidies, Kessler and Meghir, 1991). The importance of reputation and 
relationships in China’s private sector alternative financing and governance 
mechanism is also discussed in depth by AQQ (2005). 
Corresponding to the supply side, the majority of Chinese firms are typically 
financed from a mixture of debt and equity. Bank loans constitute firm’s debt, and 
almost exclusively from domestic banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. 
Equity, on the other hand, can be distinguished by financing source: from state budget 
appropriations, self-raised sources and foreign investment. Equity finance from state 
budget appropriations refer to the appropriations in the budget of the central and local 
governments earmarked for capital investment. Self-raised finance, often the most 
important source of finance for many firms, includes firms’ finance from capital 
markets, bonds issued by individual enterprises, individual borrowing and funds 
channelled through local governments, or other bodies. This is similar to what is 
referred to as informal finance in Maksimovic et al (2008). In a firm’s capital, self-
raised finance is reflected as three broad types of paid-in-capital: individual capital, 
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collective capital and corporate (or legal person) capital. Finally, many domestic firms 
also finance their activities with funds from foreign investors or other foreign funding 
sources.   
3.2 Financing patterns in China 
The role of the four financing resources in China has changed substantially during 
1980s and 1990s due to the economic reforms and financial liberation (Liu and Li, 
2001). State budgetary allocation, the dominant source of funding in the pre-reformed 
era, has been substituted by domestic bank loans and self-raised funds. The 
progression has been particularly facilitated by the SOE reforms, which are 
characterized by privatization and marketization, continuous financial system reform 
and regional decentralization. China’s open-door policy allowed a considerable level 
of foreign investment in the capital market, the role of which is increasingly visible in 
firms’ financing mix.  
According to our calculationsv, between 1998 and 2005, finance from state 
budgets, domestic bank loans, self-raised funds and foreign investments accounted for 
about 10%, 14%, 62%, and 14% of firms’ total finance respectively. The role of bank 
loans in financing firms has diminished over time. In 1998, 50% of firms have bank 
loans; in 2005 this figure has dropped to 25%. During the same period, the average 
share of bank loans in total capital has dropped from 22% to 9%, suggesting that firms 
finance more from alternative funds than bank loans. State budget allocation has also 
diminished gradually. For example, there are only 6% firms in 2005 that finance from 
state budget, compared to 33% of total firms in 1998; and the average percentage of 
the state budget in firms’ total capital dropped from 21% to 3%vi. Huang (2003) 
argues that the large amount of foreign direct investment in China is an indicator of 
indigenous private sector firms’ financial constraints. Indeed, foreign investment has 
become a very important source of financing for Chinese firms, and not only for 
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private firms. It is therefore surprising that foreign investment seems to be ignored in 
the recent finance and growth studies in China. 
4. Empirical framework and econometric issues 
 
To asses the impact of financing sources on firm growth performance, we specify the 
following reduced form equation: 
            Growthit = α + β'FIN jit−1 + γ ' Xit−1 + ′ δ OWNit + φ'Di + εit ,                      (1) 
where firm performance is measured by TFP Growth using Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) approach for firm i at time t (see Appendix 1 for further details). FIN is a 
vector of financing source variables: state finance, domestic banks loan, self-raised 
finance and foreign investments, defined by the share of each source in a firm’s total 
financevii. Since the four shares add up to one, the finance from state budget is set as 
the base group whenever all four financing sources are present. The vector X includes 
a set of control variables that the literature has found to determine firm growth. It 
includes firm age and firm size that is measured by total employment (e.g. Evans, 
1987a; Geroski, 1995; Carbral and Mata, 2003), firm’s initial TFP level that is to test 
whether firm growth is affected by technological endowment. Finally, D is the full set 
of firm’s ownership, industrial, regional and time dummies and it is a random error 
term.  
Firm level analyses are often beset by some econometric issues that may 
introduce bias to OLS estimator, namely heterogeneity, selectivity and endogeneity. 
In light of these issues, we start estimating Equation (1) using OLS estimator with 
robust standard errors and we also address firm heterogeneity by applying the outlier 
robust regression models (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987), which offers estimates that 
are not sensitive to the presence of extreme values and effectively controlling for 
outliers.  
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Since firm growth is only observed for firms that have survived, it is necessary 
to assess and correct the selection bias due to survivorshipviii. A popular method for 
correcting selectivity bias is the Heckman approach (1976), which however is not 
appropriate for panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, its 
extension to linear unobserved heterogeneity panel data models by Wooldridge (1995) 
can identify the extent of selectivity bias in the model. The procedure is a two-stage 
estimator: in the first stage, non-selection hazard variables are estimated by a sample 
selection model of firm survival on a yearly basis, which are included in the original 
model to correct for the selectivity bias at the second stage. The variables included in 
the selection equations are quadratic terms of firm size and age, TFP level, firm 
export and innovation activity and industry exit rate. These are variables that are 
typically used in the firm survival literature (e.g. Dunne and Hughes, 1994 and Mata 
et al., 1995).  
Notwithstanding the fact that the financial source variables are lagged by one 
period, there may still be the possibility that firms’ capital structure is correlated with 
some unobserved factors that also influence firm growth. Consequently we may face 
the endogeneity problem induced by multiple endogenous variables with discreteness 
(finance source variables are truncated). In this case, Wooldridge (2003, 2005), show 
that the usual IV or control function estimators, such as Smith and Blundell (1986) 
and Rivers and Vuong (1988), fail to deliver consistent estimates in this case. To our 
best knowledge, the only available econometric technique for tackling such a problem 
is the correction function approach of Wooldridge (2005), which is an extension to the 
standard IV estimator. The study has shown that augmenting the baseline model, such 
as Equation (1) with appropriately defined correction functions will deliver consistent 
estimates of the parameters of interest.    
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Assume FINj (j=1,2,3) are the truncated finance structure variablesix, which take 
standard Tobit reduced forms: 
         [ iiiij ZXFIN ]ξϑϑϑ +++= '2'1'0,0max                                           (2) 
where ],|[ ZXξ ~ iid N (0, ), and X is the vector of covariates described in equation 
(1). Z is the vector of the available instrumental variables, for which , or 
in other words they are assumed to be exogenous and redundant in determining firm 
growth in the structural conditional expectation. Wooldridge (2005) shows that, 
ignoring the individual firm indicator, the correction function for models with 
truncated endogenous variables can be generated as: 
2σ
0)'( =XZE
         ,   and ( ) ( )σϑσϑ /,, 2 rZXh j Φ⋅= ( )iii zxr ,,1≡ )( 21 ,, ϑϑϑϑ o≡ ,              (3) 
where  is the cumulative normal density. Then Equation (1) can be modified by 
adding the correction function and the interaction terms of the endogenous variables 
FIN with the mean variance of each element of the vector X, for the omitted variable 
bias that plagues the usual IV estimators : 
(.)Φ
Growthit =α + β j 'FINijtj∑ + χ' Xit + δ j 'FINijt(Xit − X t )j∑ + ρijthijtj∑ +ϕ'OWNit + φ'Di+εit .  (4)         
Equation (4) is then estimated by OLS with corrected standard errors by bootstrapping 
to account for the fact that correction functions are the generated regressors. A test of 
joint significance of the correction functions and the interaction terms provides a test 
of exogeneity of the finance variables. 
To estimate correct functions, we need to provide valid instrumental variables 
that are relevant and exogenous to firm growth. To this end, we employ firms’ 
political affiliation indicators, regional level or industrial level indicators of market 
condition, financial development and legal environment. Political affiliations are a set 
of dummy variables indicating the administrative level at which firms are being 
‘supervised’. More than half of Chinese firms (including private firms) are affiliated 
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to some level of governments, and the affiliations may affect firm’s finance structure. 
For example, the association with government agencies can help obtain credit 
guarantees or collateral assets that banks demand (see, Huang, 2003).  It is noteworthy 
that political affiliations are normally assigned to firms when they are established and 
therefore they can be considered exogenous to the error term of the current growth 
process.  
At 3-digit SIC level, the instrumental variables SOEs share and Private share 
are defined as SOEs’ and private firms’ market share within the corresponding 3-digit 
SIC industry and province in terms of industrial sales. These instrumental variables 
are designed to capture the market and political environments, which may influence 
firms’ access to financing sources. For example, in the presence of soft-budget 
constraint (Lin et al, 1998), non-SOE firms in a region and industry with high 
concentration of SOEs would find it relatively more difficult to obtain funds from 
state budgets and bank loans.  
By the same token, firms in industries or provinces that are more open to non-
state sector investment can reasonably be assumed more likely to access foreign 
finance. At regional level, we include indices of regional financial development, 
financial market competitiveness, asset allocation marketization, difficulty in 
attracting FDI, and legal environment (measured by the number of lawyers over 
population). In the macro econometric literature, some of these variables are shown to 
be good instruments for the access to finance variables (e.g. Levine, 2005).  
It is worth noting that these variables by nature are exogenous to firm level 
growth performance for the way their being constructed. To test the relevance of the 
instruments, we implement the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank test (rk test in the table) 
for the rank condition , which is a generalization of the Anderson 
Canonical correlation rank test (Anderson, 1984) and closely related to the minimum-
kXZrank ≥)'(
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eigenvalue test statistics proposed by Cragg and Donald (1993) (also see Hall, 
Rudebusch and Wilcox, 1996)x.  
5. Data and summary statistics  
 
Our data draws on the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprise Statistics compiled by 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, covering the population of Chinese 
state-owned manufacturing enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with annual 
turnover more than 5 million RMB Yuan (about $620,000). The sample accounts for 
nearly 90% of total industrial output. The dataset employed in this paper spans the 
period of 1998-2005, containing detailed information such as inputs, output, source of 
finance, exports,  product innovation  as well as the ownership structure, industry 
affiliation, geographic location xi . The data exhibit a good balance across the 
manufacturing industries and provinces in China, as shown in the Appendix Table 1. 
At regional level, financial development is measured by private credit (credit to the 
private sector) over regional GDP, to capture the degree of regional financial 
development (following King and Levine, 1993). We also have several regional 
indices using the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index of 
Marketization of China’s Provinces 2004 Report, which is based on statistical census 
and survey data during 2001-2002 (Fan and Wang, 2005). 
Traditionally firms’ ownership is classified according to the Regulation of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Management of Registration of Corporate 
Enterprises. This classification has been questioned recently (e.g. Dollar and Shang-
Jin Wei, 2007), given that ownership changes among Chinese enterprises have 
frequently taken place during the reforms period. This motivates us to define a more 
reliable ownership composition measure based on the share of equity capital 
contributed by different sources, such as the state, collective investors, domestic 
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private and foreign investors.  Specifically,  the ownership is classified as: (1) State-
owned enterprises (SOE): if state budget is the major source of capital, which means 
if state budget is equal to or more than 50% of equity finance; (2) Collective 
enterprises (COE): if collective capital is equal or more than 50% in equity finance; 
(3) Foreign invested enterprises (FOR): if foreign capital (incl. capital from Hong 
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan and foreign countries) is the major source of capital, which 
means if foreign capital is equal to or more than 50% of equity; (4) Domestic private 
enterprises (Private): all domestic firms which are not classified as SOEs or FORs. 
This group can further be split into three sub-groups: (4a) Private with state capital 
(Private_state): if state capital is less than 50% in equity finance; (4b) Private with 
foreign capital (Private_for): if foreign capital is less than 50% in equity finance and 
there is no state capital; (4c) Pure private (PPrivate), private firms without any state or 
foreign finance. 
 The data structure in terms of firm ownership is summarized in Table 2.  The 
majority (56.17%) of the firms in the sample are private firms, 48.13% of these are 
pure private firms. There are relatively few private firms with state capital (2.66%) 
and private firms with foreign capital (5.38%). The average percentage of SOEs in the 
sample over 1998-2005 is 17.16%, but the figure has dropped from 34% in 1998 to 
5% in 2005 (not presented in the table), mainly because of SOEs’ privatisation and a 
large-scale entry of non-state firms. Also 13.51% of the firms are COEs and 13.17% 
are FORs, 60% of which are mainly financed by investors from Hong Kong, Macau 
and Taiwan. Partially due to the way ownership is classified; the financing pattern 
reflects firm’s ownership structure (Table 3). Only firms with state ownership xii  
(SOEs and private firms with state capital) employ all four financing sources; firms 
with foreign ownership use three sources except state finance. It is noticeable that 
firms with state ownership enjoy the greatest access to bank loans. Self-raised finance 
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supplies the vast majority of finance to collectively owned enterprises (82.48%) and 
pure private firms (87.9%). It is also interesting to see that foreign investment does 
not only finance foreign firms, but also domestic private firms (18.85% for private 
firms with state capital and 27.95% for private firms with foreign capital) and even 
SOEs (1.66%). 
Table 4 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) measure is estimated following the methodology of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This approach has been applied widely in the recent 
productivity literature because its allows to control for the simultaneity between 
firm’s choice of input levels and unobserved productivity shocksxiii. The average TFP 
growth reaches 8.3% over the sample period, with a high standard deviation 
indicating substantial heterogeneity among firms. Employment, however, dropped by 
of 3.6% during the examined period, mainly due to layoffs in SOEs caused by the 
process of privatization and marketization.  
The average firm age is approximately 10 years, and the average firm size in 
the sample, measured as the logarithm of total employment, is 4.837 (equal to 126 
employees). On average the market share of state sector in 3-digit SIC classified 
industrial level is 13%, and private sector is 57.3%. Overall, more than half of the 
firms in our sample show political affiliations at some level. Around 7% of the firms 
are affiliated with either the central government or provincial governments, and nearly 
10% with regional governments; the rest 44% are affiliated with lower level (i.e. 
prefecture, county) governments.   
Finally, Table 5 shows the spearman rank correlation coefficients of finance 
variables with other variables. The variables listed on the left hand side of the table 
are the additional instrumental variables used in the correction function approach. 
They are correlated monotonically with the finance variables significant at various 
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degrees, with one exception of foreign finance variable and the affiliation to central 
and provincial government.  
6. Empirical Findings 
6.1 Does financing source make difference to TFP growth? 
Table 6 presents the estimation results based on the full sample using the four 
econometric modelling techniques discussed in Section 4. Notably financing source 
variables, Bank Loan, Self-raised finance and Foreign finance, obtain positive and 
highly significant signs relative to State budget (which is the reference group) across 
estimators. Column (1) presents the baseline model estimates using OLS with White’s 
robust standard errors. Relative to state budget, three other finance variables have 
similar marginal effects on firm TFP growth (around 6%). Column (2) presents the 
outlier robust regression estimates that report lower effects of finance variable, 
suggesting that the OLS results might have been driven by the fast growing individual 
firms in the sample. The correction of survival selectivity alters the relative magnitude 
of the marginal effects of bank loan and self-raised finance in Column (3). In Column 
(4), the null hypothesis of exogeneity of finance is emphatically rejected, vindicating 
the application of the correction function approach. The Kleibergen-Paap 
heteroskedastic robust rank condition test suggests the strong relevance of the 
additional instrumental variables employed. Controlling for the endogeneity of 
finance variables, the correction function estimates tell the same story with the 
selectivity correction estimates about the relative importance of the four financing 
sources. Although it is unfortunate that there is no available method that combines 
selectivity correction and endogeneity correction in our case with multiple truncated 
endogenous variables, both estimators that deal with the econometric issues deliver 
qualitatively the same message - the results strongly suggest that the source of finance 
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matters for firm growth. At national average level, foreign finance leads to the highest 
TFP growth rate, followed by self-raised finance and then bank loans during the 
examined period, all else being equal.  
Turning to control variables, across all estimators, we find that the initial TFP 
level enters with a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that productivity 
convergence is taking place (Table 6). Younger firms tend to grow faster, as both age 
and age-squared register negative and significant signs. We also uncover a U-shaped 
relationship between firm size and growth. Although the literature on the relationship 
between firm size and growth is inconclusive (Geroski, 1995), our finding is in line 
with the existing empirical evidence from emerging countries (e.g. Konings and 
Xavier, 2002). The coefficients of ownership dummy variables consistently show that 
non-SOEs grow much faster than SOEs, and the fastest growing ones are pure private 
domestic firms and foreign-invested firms.  
 
6.2 Financing source, TFP growth and ownership 
Next we investigate how the relationship between financing source and TFP growth 
differs across ownership types. The findings discussed below are based on the 
correction function estimates by ownership as reported in Table 7. We also provide 
the selection model estimates for comparison in the Appendix Table 2. Reassuringly, 
as in the full sample estimation case, the two sets of results are qualitatively the same. 
It is worth mentioning that as we split the sample by ownership, the base group of 
finance variables needs to be reset because not all firms are financed from the state 
budget. For example, COEs are financed only from bank loans and self-raised 
finance, thus, the marginal effect of bank loan is then estimated relative to that of self-
raised finance. 
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We find that the relationship between financing sources and firm TFP growth  
is heterogeneous across ownership types. In Table 7 Column (1), SOEs with higher 
proportion of bank loans in the financing mix tend to be poor performers, while 
foreign finance has the most pronounced positive impacts. A 10-percent point 
increase of foreign finance in a SOE’s capital is associated with a 2.61 percent 
increase in the TFP growth.  SOEs are not the only firms which foreign finance has 
prominent effect. As reported in Column (3), for private firms with some state finance 
(Private_state), foreign investment appears to be the only significant financing 
channel leading to productivity growth. By contrast, domestic bank loan seems 
working well for foreign-invested firms, both private domestic firms with some 
foreign investment (Private_for in Column (5)), and foreign-owned firms (FOR in 
Column (6)). Self-raised finance is found to be more important than bank loan for the 
performance of COEs and pure private firms (PPrivate). 
 
6.3 Financing source and employment growth 
TFP growth is likely to be related to technology advancement, management efficiency 
and skill-upgrading leading to long term development. In the short term, firm growth 
through employment creation could also be a desirable social objective. Accordingly, 
we analyse the role of financial structure in driving employment growth. The results 
of the full sample estimation by ownership are reported in Table 8. Overall, we 
confirm the results reported earlier that financial structure matters for firm growth. 
Interestingly, we discover a somewhat different pattern from what is found in the case 
of TFP growth.  
We find that that, among four financing sources, domestic bank loans play a 
much more positive role in driving firms’ employment growth than in driving TFP 
growth. For the full sample in Column (1), COE in Column (3), private firms with 
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state capital (Private_state) in Column (4), PPrivate in Column (5) Private_for in 
Column (6) and FOR in Column (7), bank loans have the largest significant positive 
effects on employment growth. Comparing horizontally across ownership types, we 
find that the marginal effect of bank loans tend to be higher for firms with state funds 
than firms without state funds, and it is the smallest for pure private firms. For SOEs, 
foreign investment (with marginal effects 0.0676) has slightly greater impact than 
bank loans (with marginal effects 0.0512).  
Also in Table 8, the control variables in the employment growth equation 
confirm the U-shaped relationship not only between firm size and growth, but also 
between firm age and employment growth. We find that the capital intensity enters 
with a positive and significant coefficient for the full sample, COE, pure private firms, 
and foreign firms, suggesting that more capital intensive firms tend to grow faster in 
employment.  
  
6.4 The complementarities between financing channels 
Summarizing the findings so far, we have shown that there are strong 
complementarities between the financing channels examined, particularly between 
domestic finance and foreign finance, as well as between bank loans and self-raised 
finance. The overwhelming majority of Chinese firms have mixed financial structure 
and the relationship between finance and growth contingent on ownership and growth 
channel. For example, firms with state ownership (SOEs and Private_states) seem to 
benefit the most from foreign finance, while domestic bank loans appear to foster the 
highest growth among foreign-invested enterprises. This pattern may imply 
complementarities between foreign and indigenous capital. It is not difficult to find 
plenty theories and evidence that in host counties foreign investments generate 
productivity spillover effects through innovation, management and marketing 
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channels and competition effects. Especially in China, it is believed that by attracting 
FDI firms gain easier accesses to some scarce resources, not only finance, but also 
land, entry to certain markets and preferential treatments from the government (Chun 
and Chen, 2008). Likewise, foreign-invested firms may benefit to some degree from 
getting connections with local financial intermediaries through borrowing bank loans.  
Self-raised finance is more efficient at driving growth than bank loans for 
COEs and pure private firms, which are arguably the most financially constrained 
firms in China. This result support AQQ’s argument (2005) with empirical evidence 
that the private sector that contribute greatly to the economy depends upon alternative 
financing channels and governance mechanisms. As such, self-raised financing 
channels have played an important role in facilitating the economic growth by 
complementing formal financial channels through bank loans. Its existence is not only 
necessary but also critical.  
Where do our findings stand in the context of the recent debate regarding the 
relative importance of China’s formal and informal financial systems in supporting 
firm growth? AQQ (2005) argue that China’s economic growth is largely due to the 
performance of private sector firms that heavily rely on informal finance. By contrast, 
Maksimovic et al (2008) find firms financed by formal bank loans grow faster. Based 
on a large dataset covering virtually the population of SOEs and a large chunk of non-
state firms, and on econometric techniques that tackle the potential endogeneity of the 
finance variables, our finding strongly suggests that it is too sweeping to draw a 
conclusion that the formal financial system is more important than informal one or 
vice versa. It is the mixture of various financial arrangements and agents from which 
the Chinese industrial firms have benefited. Perhaps what matters in the end is not the 
specific channel of finance, but the ‘structure’ of finance. 
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6.5 The role of state-owned financial arrangements 
Interestingly, among SOEs and Private_states that are partially financed by the state, 
there is no statistical evidence to suggest that bank loans have played different role 
from the state budget in promoting firm’s TFP growth. In fact, both channels are 
found to be less efficient in driving growth than self-raised finance and foreign 
finance (Table 7 Column 1 and 3). This supports the theory of the property rights of 
state-owned financial institutions for transitional economies (Majumdar, 1996a; 1999). 
From the perspective of corporate governance, it contends that property rights of 
financial capital are attenuated in state-owned financial institutions because the 
market for corporate control is inadequate or absent. The relationships between firms, 
banks and government are often intertwined and obscure. This induces agency 
problems and may result in a negative association between firms’ leverage and 
performance.  
Consider in our case, that bank loans are mainly issued by China’s four state-
owned commercial banks that only evolved into commercial banks in the post mid-
1980s, after acting as the state’s cashier for over thirty years. Although the recent 
reforms and development in the state banking sector have been dramatic, such as 
transferring billions of nonperforming loans to four Assets Management Companies 
and listing state-owned banks in stock markets that aimed to recuperate the asset 
structure, it is not hard to believe that these banks still bare historical burdens of 
underperforming SOE customers. With the property right of being state-owned, these 
banks may have a long way ahead before they are totally independent through 
privatization. Until then their existence could be inevitably multiply oriented – serve 
its owner in all possible ways. Indeed from our results, the evidence suggests that 
bank loans and state budget are the most employment growth-promoting financing 
channel for SOEs (Table 8). More broadly, there also seems to be a pattern that 
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foreign finance and self-raised finance are more likely to be associated with TFP 
growth, while bank loan appears more likely to be associated with employment 
growth.  
The performance of bank loans, however, can be rather different for the non-
state sector. The finding that domestic bank loans help foreign-invested firms grow 
more efficiently indicates that the reforms in the financial system in recent years 
might have improved the ability of Chinese banks’ financial resource allocation. 
7. Conclusion   
 
Using a comprehensive firm-level dataset with 1.46 million observations spanning the 
period 1998-2005, this paper depicts a detailed picture of China’s financial sectors 
and industrial firms’ financing pattern, and provides a thorough investigation of the 
relationship between financing source and firm growth. We ask two questions. First, 
does financing source matter to firm growth? And second, if it does, which is the most 
important financing source? The answer to the first question is an emphatic yes, 
although this does not tell the whole story. As for the second question, at national 
level, we find that controlling for the endogeneity of finance variables, and all else 
being equal, foreign finance leads to the highest growth rate in the examined period. 
Self-raised finance and domestic bank loans follow next, while state budget finance is 
the least efficient financing source in driving firm growth. The relative importance, 
however, depends greatly on ownership types and to some degree on growth channel 
(in TFP or employment). Overall, there are well-built complementarities between 
formal financing channels and informal ones, as well as between domestic finance 
and foreign investment. Nevertheless, given the sheer importance of informal 
financial arrangements in the economy, it is misleading to draw any conclusion about 
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China’s financial system without taking both formal and informal financial system 
into account.  
The next obvious question would be what is the mechanism in which each 
financing channel works to facilitate growth for different types of firms to reach such 
complementarities? The theory has formally provided us some thoughts, including the 
mechanism of peer monitoring system of informal financial system in low-income 
countries (Stiglitz, 1990; Arott and Stigltz, 1990). Other possible mechanisms that 
differentiate and characterize informal financial arrangements from formal ones, such 
as information sourcing agency and financial service pricing, will need to be theorized 
formally and examined with extensive evidence. 
If our understanding of the complementarities is correct, a policy implication for 
China’s current economic reform should aim at establishing a broader financial 
system that is able to support different types of firms’ development. An efficient 
informal financial mechanism not only provides an alternative vehicle for saving 
mobilisation and financing non-state firms, especially smaller ones, but can also be a 
catalyst for banking reforms by exposing state banks to market competition. Some 
thoughts should also be given on how does the relationship of financing source and 
growth evolve during firm’s life cycle. In further work (Du and Girma, 2008), we 
provide a preliminary effort on investigating the relationship between financing 
source, firm growth and firm size. 
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Appendix 1:  TFP estimation method 
The total factor productivity (TFP) measure is estimated following the methodology 
of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The advantage of this method lies in controlling for 
the simultaneity between firm’s choice of input levels and unobserved productivity 
shocks by using firm’s intermediate inputs (such as raw materials or electricity) as 
proxies. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i at time t is: 
 
where y is log of value added, which is sales net intermediate inputs (m), l is labour 
input and k is capital input, and  ωββωφφ ++=≡
t
 is an 
unknown function of capital and intermediate inputs. φ is strictly increasing in the 
productivity shock , so that it can be inverted and one can write itω ),( itittit kmωω =  
for some function tω . Levinshon and Petrin (2003) approximate ),( mk itittφ  by a third 
order polynomial in k and m, ∑∑  and obtain and estimate of sit
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(up to the intercept) via OLS. This constitutes the first stage of the estimation 
procedure. At the second stage, the elasticity of capital kβ  is defined as the solution 
to , where ( )2ˆmin
* ∑∑ −−
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ititlit ly
k
β
β it
*
−itk k ϖβ ϖ  is a nonparametric 
approximation [ ]1| −ititE ωω . Since the estimators involve two stages, the calculations 
of the covariance matrix of the parameters must allow for the variation due to all of 
the estimators in the two stages. Levinshon and Petrin (2003) note that the derivation 
of the analytical covariance matrix is quite involved, and suggest the bootstrapping 
procedure to estimate standard errors. In this study 200 bootstrap replications are 
performed. Once consistent estimates of the input elasticities are derived, the log of 
productivity can be obtained as .   itk k
The data of industrial value-added and intermediate input are deflated by ex-factory 
price indices published in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The fixed 
assets data are deflated by fixed asset price indices published in the China Fixed Asset 
Statistical Yearbook and Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The estimation 
has been conducted by 2-digit SIC industry categories. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Financial sectors in China 
 Financial sectors Firm’s financing channel 
Ministry of Finance, through central government and local government departments. State budget appropriations through 
budget allocation via central and local 
governments. It would invest in a firm 
as equity capital from the state. 
(
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Bank loans from banks other non-bank 
financial intermediaries; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finance from capital market, mainly 
for listed firms in stock markets. This 
would be reflected as firms’ equity 
capital, although it role is limited, 
considering there are only 1337 listed 
companies in the two stock markets in 
China by the end of 2004, which 
represent only 1% of the total national 
industrial value-added, this financing 
channel. 
Central Bank (the 
People’s Bank of 
China) 
Banks and 
other financial 
intermediaries 
Capital 
markets 
State-owned 
commercial banks
Foreign banks and 
agencies
Domestic banks
Commercial banks
Other domestic banks 
and deposit-taking 
financial institutions 
Policy/development 
banks
Shareholding 
commercial banks
Housing/building society 
Rural credit cooperatives 
Urban credit cooperatives 
(city commercial banks) 
Social security institutions and pension funds
Insurance companies
Foreign insurance companies
Domestic insurance companies
Stock market
Bond market
Money market
Foreign exchange market
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Self-raised finance, as one major 
source of equity capital, broadly 
includes finance from individual 
capital, collective capital, and 
corporate or legal person’s capital. 
There can be an extensive array of 
channels and mechanisms that operate 
self-raise finance as indicated in the 
left. 
Note 1: This table shows the structure of domestic financial sectors in China. Panel I and Panel II schematize the formal or regulated financial sectors, and informal 
financial arrangements and agents. The right-hand side column lists corresponding financial channels available at firm level from each sector, which are also 
considered in out empirical analysis.  
Note 2: The financial channels that is not included in this table but also used by many Chinese firms is foreign investments. See more discussions in Section 3.2 and 
Section 5.  
Note 3: The second Figure is adapted from Germidis, Kessler and Meghir (1991) “Financial Systems and Development: What Role For the Formal and Informal 
Financial Sectors?”, p.86. 
Individual 
moneylending
Non-commercial arrangements 
Commercial credit 
arrangements 
Friends 
Neighbours 
Households 
Money-based 
Land-based
Commodity based
Professional moneylenders 
Mobile bankers 
Private individuals from upper-income groups
Landlord
Trade-moneylenders; Equipment suppliers; 
Produce traders; Store owners 
Associations
Savings arrangements
Combined savings and 
credit arrangements 
Fixed-fund associations 
Mutual aid associations 
Savings club 
Informal credit unions 
Informal savings and loan co-operatives 
Financial intermediation 
Partnership 
firms 
Indigenous banker pawnbrokers;  
Finance companies; Investment companies; 
Leasing companies; Hire-purchase companies
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Table 2: Ownership structure defined by capital structure during 1998-2005 
Ownership Freq. Percent 
State-owned enterprises (SOE) 250,651 17.16 
Collective enterprises (COE) 197,096 13.5 
Private enterprises: 820,261 56.17 
           - Private with state capital (Private_state) 38,829 2.66 
           - Pure private enterprises (PPrviate) 702,873 48.13 
           -Private with foreign capital (Private_for) 78,559 5.38 
Foreign invested enterprises  (FOR) 192,294 13.17 
Total 1,460,302 100 
Note: The definitions of firm ownership in the table and a detailed description are 
given in the main text Section 4.3. 
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Table 3: Financing pattern of Chinese enterprises during 1998~2005 
 
 Equity finance (by sources) 
 
Ownership State 
budget Bank 
loans 
Self-raised 
finance 
Foreign investment 
(incl. from HK, 
Macau and Taiwan) 
SOE 240.97 211.60 19.76 4.72
COE 0 24.86 60.20 0
Private enterprises:  
Private_state 149.18 235.48 227.42 49.44
PPrviate 0 32.55 87.10 0
Private_for 0 68.20 179.92 30.99
FOR 0 46.38 23.77 112.90P
an
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Total amount  38.92 66.40 74.17 18.22
 State 
budget 
Bank 
Loans 
Self-raised 
finance 
Foreign investment 
SOE 66.44% 29.07% 2.83% 1.66%
COE 0 17.52% 82.48% 0
Private enterprises:     
Private_state 21.39% 20.52% 39.25% 18.85%
PPrviate 0 12.10% 87.90% 0
Private_for 0 9.22% 62.83% 27.95%
FOR 0 4.80% 6.93% 88.28%
Pa
ne
l I
:  
Sh
ar
e 
Total  9.59% 14.28% 62.35% 13.79%
Note: The figures are calculated using the dataset used in this paper. The reported means of 
financing sources by ownership in the table are tested for statistical difference by pair wise 
ownership groups, and the results suggest the access to each financing source is statistically 
different among firms under different ownership at 1% significant level. 
Note: See the definitions of ownership in Table 1. 
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Table 4.A: Summary statistics: variables at firm level  
 overall SOE COE Private
_state 
PPrviate Private_
for 
FOR 
Variables mean sd mean mean mean mean mean mean 
Firm growth         
Growth of TFP (gTFP) 0.083 0.643 0.000 0.039 0.050 0.116 0.079 0.098 
Growth of employment (gEMP) -0.009 0.528 -0.064 0.004 -0.009 -0.012 0.022 0.030 
Finance variables         
Share of state budget 0.096 0.272 0.664 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Share of bank loans 0.143 0.26 0.291 0.175 0.205 0.121 0.092 0.048 
Share of self-raised finance 0.623 0.426 0.028 0.825 0.392 0.879 0.628 0.069 
Share of foreign investment 0.138 0.315 0.017 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.280 0.883 
Firm characteristics         
TFP level 1.549 2.209 0.970 1.518 1.562 1.631 1.724 1.736 
Size (log of total employment) 4.837 1.205 5.062 4.809 5.495 4.641 5.118 5.131 
Age (years) 10.28 11.06 21.93 13.50 13.84 7.83 7.98 7.12 
Capital intensity  
(log of net fixed assets over total 
employment) 
-1.175 0.871 -1.062 -1.180 -1.082 -1.202 -1.244 -1.177 
Political affiliations (dummy)         
Affiliation to central government 0.015 0.120 0.064 0.002 0.022 0.007 0.008 0.002 
Affiliation to provincial government 0.042 0.200 0.136 0.019 0.103 0.021 0.044 0.028 
Affiliation to regional government 0.096 0.295 0.259 0.069 0.295 0.045 0.119 0.093 
Affiliation to governments at other 
levels  0.444 0.497 0.467 0.670 0.445 0.395 0.473 0.356 
No affiliation 0.442 0.497 0.069 0.115 0.143 0.610 0.404 0.636 
 
Table 4.B: Summary statistics: variables at regional/industrial level  
 
Variables mean sd 
Industrial concentration rate   
Industrial entry rate   
Industrial exit rate   
Market share (in sales) of the state sector by 3-digit SIC 
i d / i /
0.13 0.189 
Market share (in sales) of the private sector by 3-digit SIC 
i d / i /
0.573 0.248 
Financial development (bank loans to private sector over regional GDP) 0.008 0.006 
Financial market competitiveness 6.268 1.349 
Asset allocation marketization 5.677 2.89 
Difficulty in attracting FDI 3.731 2.487 
Law (total number of lawyers over total population in a province) 5.233 5.111 
Intellectual property right protection 5.526 4.964 
 
Table 5: Spearman’s rank correlation matrix 
Finance variables
Variables Share of state 
budget 
Share of 
bank loans 
Share of self-
raised finance 
Share of 
foreign 
investment 
Political affiliations     
Affiliation to central government -0.1544* 0.0275* 0.0628* 0.0017 
Affiliation to provincial government 0.2097* 0.0518* -0.1307* -0.0001 
Affiliation to regional government 0.2615* 0.1116* -0.1938* 0.0453* 
Affiliation to governments at other levels  0.1246* 0.0933* -0.0606* -0.0854* 
Regional/Industrial level indicator     
Market share (in sales) of the state sector by 3-digit SIC 
industry/region/year 0.3175* 0.2222* -0.1448* -0.1897* 
Market share (in sales) of the private sector by 3-digit SIC 
industry/region/year -0.1076* 0.0524* 0.2292* -0.2755* 
Financial development (bank loans to private sector over 
regional GDP) -0.0071* -0.0696* -0.0072* 0.0615* 
Financial market competitiveness -0.2149* -0.1304* 0.1229* 0.1039* 
Asset allocation marketization -0.2507* -0.1784* 0.1395* 0.1414* 
Difficulty in attracting FDI -0.1819* -0.1833* -0.0198* 0.2913* 
Law (total number of lawyers over total population in a 
province) -0.1577* -0.2042* 0.0232* 0.2359* 
Intellectual property right protection -0.2549* -0.2107* 0.0589* 0.2668* 
Note: * indicate significance level at 1% level. 
Table 6: Financing sources and firm TFP growth 
Note 1: The dependent variable is firm TFP growth, estimated by Levinson and Petrin (2003) method (see Appendix 1 
for details). Note 2: The estimator (1) is OLS with the White’s robust standard errors. The Estimator (2) is Outlier 
robust regression, to deal with firm heterogeneity (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987). The estimator (3) is the selection 
model by Wooldridge (1995), as an extension to the standard Heckman selection method. The reported joint 
significance of yearly nonselection hazard varaibles at the bottom of the table validates the adoption of the method. 
The estimator (4) is the correction function approach by Wooldridge (2005), applied to correct for endogeneity bias. 
The reported joint significance of correction function and the interaction terms indicate the existence of endogeneity. 
The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistics provides an overidentification tests for the included instrumental variables. 
Note 3: All estimations include the full sets of industry (2-digit SIC level), regional dummies (province level) and 
year dummies, each set of which are jointly significant in all specifications. Note 4: § indicates that the coefficients of 
pairwise financing source variables are tested using F-test, and there are statistically significant differences at 1% 
significance level between the estimates of the coefficients of bank loans and self-raised finance, between those of 
bank loans and foreign finance, and between self-raised finance and foreign finance. Note 5: Standard errors in 
parentheses for (1) and (2), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses for (3) and (4),*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Estimator (1) OLS, 
robust error 
(2)Outlier robust 
Regression 
(3) Selectivity 
correction 
(4) Correction 
function 
Finance     
Bank Loan 0.0699***§ 0.0507***§ 0.0732***§ 0.0373***§
 (0.0069) (0.0046) (0.0067) (0.0078) 
Self-raised finance 0.0569***§ 0.0368***§ 0.0905***§ 0.0746***§
 (0.0067) (0.0044) (0.0064) (0.0074) 
Foreign finance 0.0686***§ 0.0421***§ 0.114***§ 0.0969***§
 (0.0093) (0.0064) (0.0089) (0.011) 
Reference group State budget State budget State budget State budget 
Firm characteristics     
Age -0.0199*** -0.0119*** -0.0934*** -0.0593*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0044) (0.0065) 
Age-squared -0.607*** -0.420*** -1.872*** -2.997*** 
 (0.10) (0.079) (0.10) (0.17) 
Size -0.0709*** -0.0512*** -0.202*** -0.234*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.016) 
Size-squared 1.420*** 0.921*** 2.537*** 2.320*** 
 (0.047) (0.034) (0.050) (0.15) 
TFP level -0.138*** -0.0795*** -0.232*** -0.175*** 
 (0.0015) (0.00075) (0.0018) (0.0025) 
Ownership     
COE 0.0664*** 0.0341*** 0.0639*** 0.0355*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0060) 
Private_state 0.108*** 0.0536*** 0.113*** 0.0927*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0069) 
PPrivate 0.0917*** 0.0509*** 0.118*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0056) 
Private_for 0.116*** 0.0668*** 0.101*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0045) (0.0059) (0.0067) 
FOR 0.115*** 0.0659*** 0.101*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0054) (0.0072) (0.0082) 
Constant 1.019*** 0.640*** 1.376*** 2.179*** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.052) 
Observations 447354 447354 447688 415304 
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.19 0.12 
Joint significance of non-
selection hazard 
variables 
  F(7,171524)= 
3728.64;P-
value=0.0000 
 
Exogeneity test for 
correction function 
   Chi(18) = 9609; P-
value=0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Heteroskedastic robust 
Rank condition test  
   Chi-sq(26)=27125.14;  
p-value=0.0000 
Table 7: Financing sources, TFP growth and ownership: correction function estimates 
Note 1: The dependent variable is firm TFP growth, estimated by Levinson and Petrin (2003) method (see Appendix 1 
for details). Note 2: The estimator of this set of results is the correction function approach by Wooldridge (2005), 
applied to correct for endogeneity bias. The reported joint significance of correction function and the interaction terms 
indicate the existence of endogeneity. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistics provides an overidentification tests 
for the included instrumental variables. Note 3: § indicates that the coefficients of pairwise financing source variables 
are tested using F-test, and there are statistically significant differences at 1% significance level between the estimates 
of the coefficients of bank loans and self-raised finance, between those of bank loans and foreign finance, and between 
self-raised finance and foreign finance. Note 4: All estimations include the full sets of industry (2-digit SIC level), 
regional dummies (province level) and year dummies, each set of which are jointly significant in all specifications. 
Note 4: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses for (3) and (4),*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Private Groups (1) SOE (2) COE 
(3)Private_state (4) PPrivate (5)Private_for 
(6) FOR 
Finance       
Bank Loan -0.0196*§ -0.0174** 0.0123 0.0073 0.099*** 0.1439*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0095) (0.0315) (0.015) (0.022) (0.019) 
Self-raised finance 0.0455***§  -0.0096  0.044*** -0.0163 
 (0.0129)  (0.030)  (0.018) (0.011) 
Foreign finance 0.2611***§  0.1632***    
 (0.042)  (0.038)    
Reference group State budget Self-raised finance State budget 
Self-raised 
finance Foreign finance Foreign finance 
Firm characteristics       
Age -0.0161 -0.00396 0.00651 0.0162*** -0.116*** -0.104*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.026) (0.0063) (0.019) (0.023) 
Age-squared -0.189 -1.127*** -0.616 -0.980*** 2.219*** 0.818 
 (0.36) (0.32) (0.60) (0.16) (0.46) (0.63) 
Size 0.00158 -0.181*** -0.124*** -0.110*** -0.0800*** -0.107*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.035) (0.0090) (0.019) (0.018) 
Size-squared 1.298*** 2.109*** 1.803*** 1.693*** 1.465*** 1.554*** 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.29) (0.090) (0.17) (0.17) 
TFP level -0.160*** -0.170*** -0.139*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.170*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0095) (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0045) 
Constant 1.244*** 1.793*** 1.484*** 1.284*** 1.308*** 1.749*** 
 (0.083) (0.077) (0.15) (0.041) (0.086) (0.075) 
Observations 53121 63942 13025 204090 32680 59080 
R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.12 
Exogeneity test for 
correction function 
Chi(18) = 
6610.47;P-
value=0.0000 
Chi(6) = 
1034.56;P-
value =0.0000 
Chi(18) = 
5832.01;P-
value=0.0000 
Chi(6) 
=2906.64;P-
value = 0.0000 
Chi(12) = 
3694.50; P-value 
= 0.0000 
Chi(12) 
=1120.09;P-
value= 0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Heteroskedastic 
robust Rank 
condition test  
Chi-
sq(26)=34301.21;  
p-value=0.0000 
Chi-
sq(7)=8612.51;  
p-value=0.000 
Chi-
sq(26)=34301.21;  
p-value=0.0000 
Chi-
sq(7)=8612.51;  
p-value=0.000 
Chi-
sq(16)=44893.10;  
p-value=0.000 
Chi-
sq(16)=44893.10;  
p-value=0.000 
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Table 8: Financing sources and employment growth 
Note 1: The dependent variable is firm employment growth. Note 2: The estimator of this set of results is the 
correction function approach by Wooldridge (2005), applied to correct for endogeneity bias. The reported joint 
significance of correction function and the interaction terms indicate the existence of endogeneity. The Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM test statistics provides an over-identification tests for the included instrumental variables. Note 3: § 
indicates that the coefficients of pairwise financing source variables are tested using F-test, and there are statistically 
significant differences at 1% significance level between the estimates of the coefficients of bank loans and self-raised 
finance, between those of bank loans and foreign finance, and between self-raised finance and foreign finance. Note 4: 
All estimations include the full sets of industry (2-digit SIC level), regional dummies (province level) and year 
dummies, each set of which are jointly significant in all specifications. Note 4: Bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses for (3) and (4),*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Private 
Groups (1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE (4) 
Private_state 
(5)PPrivate (6) 
Private_for 
(7) FOR 
Finance        
Bank Loan 0.0618***§ 0.0512*** 0.0140** 0.0670*** 0.00930*** 0.0350** 0.0370*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0063) (0.0060) (0.019) (0.0031) (0.015) (0.0099) 
Self-raised finance 0.0372***§ 0.0426***  0.0489***  0.0256** -0.0184*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0077)  (0.016)  (0.011) (0.0067) 
Foreign finance 0.0191***§ 0.0676***  0.0496**    
 (0.0059) (0.023)  (0.019)    
Reference group State budget State 
budget 
Self-raised 
finance 
State budget Self-raised 
finance 
Foreign 
finance 
Foreign 
finance 
Firm characteristics        
Age -0.00976*** -0.0399*** -0.0264*** -0.0116 -0.0326*** -0.0403*** -0.0761*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0085) (0.0071) (0.018) (0.0029) (0.014) (0.0095) 
Age-squared 0.235*** 0.847*** 0.375** -0.128 0.663*** -0.263 1.088*** 
 (0.079) (0.18) (0.18) (0.44) (0.082) (0.43) (0.29) 
Size -0.125*** -0.128*** -0.215*** -0.162** -0.255*** -0.220*** -0.170*** 
 (0.0079) (0.011) (0.014) (0.065) (0.0072) (0.045) (0.011) 
Size-squared 1.043*** 0.949*** 1.552*** 1.179** 1.966*** 1.768*** 1.268*** 
 (0.073) (0.088) (0.14) (0.59) (0.074) (0.44) (0.11) 
Capital intensity 0.00276*** -0.000416 0.00324* 0.00159 0.00441*** -0.000710 0.00513*** 
 (0.00069) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0043) (0.00097) (0.0028) (0.0018) 
Ownership        
COE 0.00476       
 (0.0030)       
Private_state 0.0339***       
 (0.0033)       
PPrivate -0.00330       
 (0.0028)       
Private_for 0.0408***       
 (0.0035)       
FOR 0.0414***       
 (0.0047)       
Constant 0.360*** 0.673*** 0.384*** 0.801*** 0.739*** 0.769*** 0.643*** 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) (0.17) (0.018) (0.11) (0.032) 
Observations 708722 86431 96552 19632 371052 43160 91895 
R-squared 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.27 
Exogeneity test for 
correction function 
Chi(18) = 
5119.14;P-
value=0.0000 
Chi(18) = 
4309.73;P-
value=0.00
00 
Chi(6) = 
977.06;P-
value 
=0.0000 
Chi(18) = 
5392.00;P-
value=0.0000 
Chi(6) 
=2906.64;P-
value = 
0.0000 
Chi(12) = 
2991.13; P-
value = 
0.0000 
Chi(12) 
=2809.74;P-
value= 
0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Heteroskedastic 
robust Rank 
condition test  
Chi-sq(26) = 
34301.21;p-
value =0.0000 
Chi-sq(26) 
=34301.21; 
p-value 
=0.0000 
Chi-sq(7) = 
8612.51;   p-
value=0.000 
Chi-sq(26) = 
34301.21;  p-
value=0.0000 
Chi-sq(7) = 
8612.51;  p-
value=0.000 
Chi-sq(16) = 
44893.10;  p-
value=0.000 
Chi-sq(16) 
=44893.10; 
p-
value=0.000 
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Appendix Tables 
A. Table 1: Dataset structure 
Table 1.1 By year 
year Freq. Percent 
1998 149,559 10.24 
1999 147,060 10.07 
2000 148,239 10.15 
2001 156,782 10.74 
2002 166,809 11.42 
2003 181,067 12.4 
2004 259,313 17.76 
2005 251,473 17.22 
Total 1,460,302 100 
 
Table 1.2 By 2-digit SIC industrial classification 
sic2 Freq. Percent 
13-Food Processing 95,706 6.55 
14-Food Production 39,877 2.73 
15-Beverage Industry 27,639 1.89 
16-Tabacco Industry 2,313 0.16 
17-Textile Industry 122,010 8.36 
18-Garments and Other Fibre Products 69,829 4.78 
19-Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 34,303 2.35 
20-Timber Processing 28,231 1.93 
21-Furniture Manufacturing 15,994 1.1 
22-Papermaking and Paper Products 44,966 3.08 
23-Printing and Record Medium Reproduction 33,485 2.29 
24-Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods 18,365 1.26 
25-Petroleum Refining and Coking 10,775 0.74 
26-Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 108,354 7.42 
27-Medical products 31,803 2.18 
28-Chemical Fibre 7,487 0.51 
29-Rubber Products 17,212 1.18 
30-Plastic Products 65,582 4.49 
31-Nonmetal Mineral Products 129,913 8.9 
32-Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 34,986 2.4 
33-Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 26,786 1.83 
34-Metal Products 77,562 5.31 
35-Ordinary Machinery 103,484 7.09 
36-Special Purposes Equipment 61,092 4.18 
37-Transport Equipment 67,947 4.65 
39-Other Electronic Equipment  76,420 5.23 
40-Electrical Equipment and Machinery 50,153 3.43 
41-Electronic and communication appliances 22,793 1.56 
42-Meters and office appliances 30,825 2.11 
43-Other Manufacturing 4,410 0.3 
Total 1,460,302 100 
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A. Table 2: Financing sources and firm TFP growth: Selection model estimation by 
ownership 
Note 1: The dependent variable is firm TFP growth. Note 2: The estimator adopted is the selection method by 
Wooldridge (1995). This is a modified technique based on Heckman (1976) to suit panel data model like equation (1). 
The variables included in the selection equations are quadratic terms of size and age, productivity, industry 
concentration and industry entry and exit rate. These are standard variables used in the firm survival literature (e.g. 
Dunne and Hughes, 1994 and Mata et al., 1995). The procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first 
stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage 
includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for unobserved simultaneity. The reported joint significance of 
yearly selection mechanism variables validates the adoption of the method. Note 3: All estimations include the full 
sets of industry and regional dummies, both of which are jointly significant in all specifications. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustered firms in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Private Groups (1) SOE 
(2) 
COE (3) Private_state (4) PPrivate (5) Private_for 
(6) 
FOR 
Finance       
Bank Loan -0.0205** 0.0474 -0.00713 0.00618 0.103*** 0.1652** 
 (0.0097) (0.028) (0.029) (0.013) (0.037) (0.018) 
Self-raised 
finance 
0.0883***  0.0119  0.0695** -0.152** 
 (0.012)  (0.027)  (0.033) (0.072) 
Foreign 
finance 
0.179***  0.142***    
 (0.033)  (0.033)    
Reference 
group State budget 
Self-raised 
finance State budget 
Self-raised 
finance 
Foreign 
finance 
Foreign 
finance 
Firm 
characteristics
      
Age 0.0888*** 0.153*** 0.104*** 0.0962*** 0.0131 -0.0143 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.0056) (0.020) (0.023) 
Age-squared -1.452*** -2.910*** -1.738*** -1.592*** 0.486 1.092* 
 (0.31) (0.28) (0.50) (0.13) (0.50) (0.63) 
Size -0.0625*** -0.239*** -0.171*** -0.224*** -0.195*** -0.243*** 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.032) (0.0081) (0.022) (0.016) 
Size-squared 1.635*** 2.743*** 2.322*** 2.623*** 2.428*** 2.781*** 
 (0.097) (0.17) (0.27) (0.079) (0.20) (0.15) 
TFP level -0.242*** -0.272*** -0.232*** -0.250*** -0.225*** -0.288*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0100) (0.0027) (0.0060) (0.0050) 
Constant 0.609*** 1.591*** 1.231*** 1.698*** 1.570*** 2.445*** 
 (0.042) (0.062) (0.12) (0.030) (0.082) (0.072) 
Observations 59299 60795 14161 219608 29754 64071 
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.19 0.24 
Specification 
test for 
selection 
model 
F(7,26466)=  
295.55; 
Prob>F=  
0.0000 
F(7,30811)= 
264.40; 
Prob>F=  
0.0000 
F(7,7197)=   
94.94;Prob> F 
= 0.0000 
F(7,100563) 
=3242.45; 
Prob>F= 
0.0000 
F(7,12971)=  
282.44;Prob 
>F=  0.0000 
F(7,25109) 
=594.29; 
Prob>F= 
0.000 
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A. Table 3: Financing sources and firm employment growth: Selection model estimation 
by ownership 
Note 1: The dependent variable is firm employment growth. Note 2: The estimator adopted is the selection method by 
Wooldridge (1995). This is a modified technique based on Heckman (1976) to suit panel data model like equation (1). 
The variables included in the selection equations are quadratic terms of size and age, productivity, industry 
concentration and industry entry and exit rate. These are standard variables used in the firm survival literature (e.g. 
Dunne and Hughes, 1994 and Mata et al., 1995). The procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first 
stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage 
includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for unobserved simultaneity. The reported joint significance of 
yearly selection mechanism variables validates the adoption of the method. Note 3: All estimations include the full 
sets of industry and regional dummies, both of which are jointly significant in all specifications. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustered firms in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Private Groups (1)  
overall 
(2)  
SOE 
(3)  
COE (4) 
Private_state 
(5)  
PPrivate 
(6) Private_for 
(7) 
FOR 
Finance        
Bank Loan 0.0281*** 0.00878* 0.0139** 0.0518*** 0.0398*** 0.0346* 0.0489* 
 (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.076) (0.014) (0.0067) (0.019) (0.026) 
Self-raised 
finance 
0.0286*** 0.000603  0.0458***  0.0284* -0.0262 
 (0.0032) (0.0061)  (0.014)  (0.017) (0.025) 
Foreign finance 0.0379*** 0.0243  0.0503***    
 (0.0048) (0.016)  (0.016)    
Reference 
group State budget   
State 
budget 
Self-raised 
finance State budget 
Self-raised 
finance 
Foreign 
finance 
Foreign 
finance 
Firm 
characteristics
       
Age -
0.00699*** 
-0.00776 0.000271 -0.00143 0.00772*** -0.0213** -
0.0351*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.011) (0.0025) (0.0094) (0.0090) 
Age-squared 0.435*** 0.486*** 0.257** 0.105 0.116* 0.463* 0.740*** 
 (0.044) (0.12) (0.13) (0.24) (0.063) (0.24) (0.27) 
Size -0.258*** -0.172*** -0.256*** -0.195*** -0.303*** -0.228*** -0.205*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0056) (0.011) (0.015) (0.0050) (0.014) (0.0098) 
Size-squared 1.694*** 1.086*** 1.711*** 1.260*** 2.016*** 1.466*** 1.245*** 
 (0.026) (0.046) (0.11) (0.13) (0.049) (0.13) (0.092) 
Capital 
intensity 
0.00652*** 0.00135 0.00713*** 0.000314 0.00907*** 0.0000367 0.0105*** 
 (0.00066) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0041) (0.00095) (0.0027) (0.0017) 
Ownership        
COE -0.0108***       
 (0.0027)       
Private_state 0.0101***       
 (0.0030)       
PPrivate 0.00246       
 (0.0025)       
Private_for 0.0144***       
 (0.0031)       
FOR 0.0293***       
 (0.0040)       
Constant 0.353*** 0.145*** 0.393*** 0.261*** 0.453*** 0.258*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0079) (0.017) (0.032) (0.047) (0.014) (0.043) (0.037) 
Observations 753096 94777 102639 20945 386456 45732 102547 
R-squared 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.29 
Specification 
test for selection 
model 
F(7,295789) 
=17965.47;    
Prob>F=    
0.0000 
F(7,40945) 
=  708.94; 
Prob>F=    
0.0000 
F(7,49608) 
=1207.16; 
Prob>F=  
0.0000 
F(7, 10606) =  
351.49;            
Prob>F=    
0.0000 
F(7,186360) 
=10923.83; 
 Prob>F=    
0.0000 
F(7, 19911) = 
1492.69; 
 Prob>F=    
0.0000 
F(7,40559) 
= 4189.07; 
Prob>F =  
0.0000 
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i The figure is calculated based on the dataset used in this paper. See also the discussion of financing pattern in 
Section 5 and Table 3. 
ii As defined in Ayyagai et al (2007), informal financial institutions include non-market institutions such as 
credit cooperatives, moneylenders, informal credit and insurance, rotating savings and credit associations which 
do not rely on formal contractual obligations enforced through a codified legal system.  
iii There is evidence that suggests the inefficiency of the state banking sector can be explained partly by the high 
cost of labour and operating expenses (Du, 2006).  
iv  See the comparison AQQ (2005) make with the widely referred sample in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, Vishny (1998). For example, China’s total value traded over GDP is only 0.11 while the LLSV-sample 
average is 0.27; its market capitalization over GDP is 0.32 while the sample average is 0.47.
v See more details on the dataset used in the paper in Section 5. 
vi The figures discussed in this section are calculated based on the dataset used in this paper, which is described 
in Section 4.3.  
vii Since the four shares add up to one, the state finance is set as the base group whenever all four financing 
sources are present. 
viii Due to the characteristics of the data, the survived non-SOEs are those included in the NBS’ census, i.e. the 
firms maintain annual turnover more than 5 million RMB Yuan. 
ix  In case of four financing source variables included, share of state budget is the omitted group in the 
estimation.  
x The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM test is adopted here because of the case of multiple nonlinear endogenous 
regressors, which rules out the application of commonly used tests proposed by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) 
for single linear endogenous regressor, Shea (1997) and generalized Anderson’s likelihood ratio for multiple 
linear endogenous regressors, as well as Cragg and Donald test for similar reasons that has been used widely. 
xi The output data are deflated using industry-specific ex-factory price indices obtained from China Statistical 
Yearbook (1999-2006). The capital variables are deflated using fixed asset price indices published in the China 
Fixed Asset Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). 
xii The definition of ownership structure is explained in more detail in the Section 4.2. 
xiii See Appendix 1 for the estimation detail. 
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